Done Talking?

By Jim Erickson

TIME (edisi Asia) · TIME edisi Asia, 9 Mei 2005 (1 halaman); liputan dibantu Matthew Forney, Kim Yooseung, dan Donald Macintyre. Bagian dari entri majalah TIME (Asia) 9 Mei 2005 · 2005-05-09

Identifier

KBA-KLP-2005-0002

Type

Kliping

Publisher

TIME (edisi Asia)

Date Issued

2005-05-09

Bibliographic Citation

TIME edisi Asia, 9 Mei 2005 (1 halaman); liputan dibantu Matthew Forney, Kim Yooseung, dan Donald Macintyre. Bagian dari entri majalah TIME (Asia) 9 Mei 2005

Creator

Jim Erickson

Subject

Korea Utara Senjata nuklir Perundingan enam pihak Nonproliferasi Kim Jong Il Christopher Hill Keamanan Asia Timur

LC Classification

JZ5665–5675 — Kontrol dan nonproliferasi senjata nuklir

LCSH Subject

Nuclear weapons -- Korea (North) Nuclear nonproliferation United States -- Foreign relations -- Korea (North)

BISAC Category

POL011010 POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / Diplomacy

Language

Inggris

Description

This clipping contains Jim Erickson's article "Done Talking?" from the Asian edition of TIME magazine, 9 May 2005. This one-page article discusses the deadlock in the six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons programme and the options the United States was beginning to consider should the talks fail. At the end there is a note that the reporting was assisted by Matthew Forney in Beijing and by Kim Yooseung and Donald Macintyre in Seoul. This entry is linked to the parent entry for the 9 May 2005 Asian edition of TIME in the same collection. Erickson opens his article with a scene illustrating the frustration of American diplomacy. US Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, the chief American negotiator on the North Korean issue, answers a journalist's question in Seoul about why Washington did not offer a bold solution by asking that the blame be placed on North Korea's leader, Kim Jong Il. To TIME, Hill even implied that it was time for Kim to be put under pressure. The author notes that this tone differed from the official stance of President George W. Bush, who still maintained that the six-party talks, involving the United States, China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and North Korea, were the most viable path. The middle part of the article sets out the signs of deadlock. According to Erickson, evidence was mounting that the talks might stall, even permanently. After meeting Chinese officials, Hill stated that the future of the talks was highly uncertain. Beijing, too, appeared to be losing enthusiasm; according to diplomatic sources, Chinese President Hu Jintao postponed a planned visit to Pyongyang because Kim refused to return to the negotiating table. Meanwhile, North Korea's capabilities were judged to be continuing to develop, including concerns about the range of its missiles. The author quotes President Bush as saying that, in dealing with a tyrant such as Kim Jong Il, it is better to assume that he has such capabilities. The article then discusses the alternatives beginning to be debated in Washington. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice alluded to the possibility of taking the matter to the UN Security Council. Through the Proliferation Security Initiative launched in 2003, the United States could step up efforts to intercept illicit shipments from North Korea. However, China, the only country with real influence over Pyongyang, rejected interference with North Korea's aid and legitimate trade, and with its permanent seat on the Security Council it could veto sanctions. Beijing feared that a political and economic collapse of North Korea would drive a wave of refugees across the border. Erickson also reports Washington's suspicion that North Korea, which in February 2005 had declared itself a nuclear-weapons state, might be preparing to conduct a nuclear test to prove its claim. Seoul stated that it had no evidence, and some suspected that the United States was deliberately exaggerating concerns to justify a harder line. The article quotes the then South Korean Foreign Minister, Ban Ki-moon, who warned that a nuclear test would deepen North Korea's isolation. The author concludes that Kim's diplomatic game is hard to predict, but the most likely outcome is that wearisome diplomacy would continue. The historical context after this article was published adds value for present-day readers. The six-party talks did continue and in September 2005 produced a joint statement containing North Korea's commitment to abandon its nuclear programme. However, the agreement did not last long. In October 2006 North Korea conducted its first nuclear test, something still debated in this article as a possibility. The six-party talks finally broke down in 2009, and North Korea conducted a series of further nuclear tests. Ban Ki-moon, quoted in this article, later became Secretary-General of the United Nations in 2007, while Christopher Hill continued to lead the American delegation in the talks until the end of the Bush administration. For the study of international relations, this article is useful as a portrait of one moment in the long history of non-proliferation diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula. It shows the classic dilemma between multilateral diplomacy and coercive pressure, China's central role as a buffer state, and tensions among allies, especially between Washington and Seoul, over threat assessment. The article can also be used to discuss the concept of securitisation and the ways the media frame nuclear threats. For readers in Southeast Asia, the issue is relevant because ASEAN, through the ASEAN Regional Forum, is one of the rare forums in which North Korea takes part in regional security dialogue. Indonesia has also had diplomatic relations with Pyongyang since the 1960s and has several times offered itself as a mediator. Thus the Korean nuclear crisis is not only an East Asian problem, but part of the wider security architecture of the Asia-Pacific. As a critical note, this article is written from a perspective that relies heavily on American officials and their allies. North Korea's perspective barely appears, except through its official statements. Readers should compare this article with more balanced academic analyses of Pyongyang's security motivations, such as its fear of regime change after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. From the standpoint of diplomatic history, the article also shows the role of individuals in international negotiations. Christopher Hill, a career diplomat who had earlier been involved in the Dayton peace negotiations for Bosnia, was known for his blunt manner of speaking. His remarks quoted by TIME show the tension between official diplomatic language and the personal exasperation of a negotiator facing an unpredictable counterpart. For students of international relations, quotations of this kind open a discussion of how officials' statements in the media can become part of a bargaining strategy, while also risking misinterpretation among the states involved. The article can also be read together with other reports in the same issue, especially the reports on the Philippine military and on Taiwan's relations with mainland China. Together they show that in mid-2005 the Asian region was facing several sources of tension at once, from internal conflicts to great-power rivalry. This clipping is therefore useful for researchers who wish to reconstruct the security map of Asia at that time from the perspective of an English-language international medium widely read among the region's elites. At that time, the six-party talks were held in Beijing, and China played the role of both host and mediator. This position gave Beijing a strong interest in keeping the talks from collapsing, since their failure would reduce China's diplomatic influence in the region. Physically, the scan consists of one magazine page with three-column text and a photograph. The left edge of the page is slightly cut off, so that some initial letters of lines are illegible, but the content of the article can generally be followed. The full text of the article is not reproduced in this catalogue because its copyright belongs to the author and the publisher; this note is a curatorial description to help users understand its content, context, and research value. Suitable search subjects include North Korea, nuclear weapons, the six-party talks, non-proliferation, Kim Jong Il, Christopher Hill, United States–China relations, and East Asian security. For citation purposes, the reference can be written as follows: Jim Erickson, "Done Talking?", TIME (Asian edition), 9 May 2005.

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Collection

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